Under North Carolina law, both the issuance of and opposition to subpoenas in a criminal case are controlled by Rule 45 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.  See N.C.G.S. § 8-61 ("[s]ubpoenas for the production of records, books, papers, documents, or tangible things may be issued in criminal actions in the same manner as provided for civil actions in Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure"); N.C.G.S. § 15A-802 ("The production of records, books, papers, documents, or tangible things in a criminal proceeding may be obtained by subpoena which must be issued and served in the manner provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1, except that subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of the rule does not apply to subpoenas issued under this section.").  

Under Rule 45(b)(5), any motion to quash or modify a subpoena may be filed by "[a] person commanded to appear at a trial, hearing, deposition, or to produce and permit the inspection and copying of records, books, papers, documents, electronically stored information, or other tangible things."  Id. (emphasis added).  

North Carolina courts have predictably upheld the proposition that parties to a litigation typically lack standing to challenge a subpoena issued to a third party.  See Jarrell v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, --N.C. App.--, 698 S.E.2d 190, 194 (2010).  See generally In re Cree, Inc. Sec. Litig., 220 F.R.D. 443, 446 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (noting general proposition that "a party lacks standing to challenge a third-party subpoena"); 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2459 (3d ed.1995) (stating a party ordinarily has no standing to challenge a subpoena issued to a non-party "unless the objecting party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought"); see also Chazin v. Lieberman, 129 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (acknowledging the existence of a similar exception in federal proceedings).  "The exception to this general rule can arise in the context of a subpoena duces tecum if a party has privilege over information requested[.]" Jarrell v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, --N.C. App.--, 698 S.E.2d 190, 194 (2010).  Thus, absent a claim by the District Attorney's Office of privilege, it has no standing to challenge the subpoenas duces tecum. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698 (1974) ("[a] subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be 'unreasonable or oppressive' but not otherwise");  United States v. Tomison, 969 F. Supp. 587, 596 (E.D. Cal. 1997)  (prosecution lacked standing to move to quash subpoena to third party because prosecution had no claim of privilege, proprietary right, or other interest in subpoenaed documents; prosecution also did not have right to receive copies of the documents unless defendant intended to introduce them at trial).